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Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo

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This study explains the behavior of democratic states during wars of choice using an integrated decision model. Integrated models are an attractive choice for explaining multifaceted decisions, particularly when simpler, existing theories have an uneven or only partial ability to explain conflict behavior. To illustrate these points, this study assesses the behavior of key NATO members during the 1999 intervention in Kosovo. I compare the behavior of France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S. with the expectations of theories of collective action, balance of threat neorealism, public opinion, and government institutional structures. As an alternative, I introduce a simple, integrated, decision-making model that incorporates the core concepts from the other explanations in a staged, conditional manner. The integrated model does a better job of explaining state behavior in Kosovo than do existing theories. The integrated model also is applicable to other conflicts. The results of this study, and the potential of integrated models, have implications for our thinking about foreign policy analysis, for behavior during military interventions and the fight against terrorism, and for future U.S. leadership of alliance and coalition war efforts.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. opened a new chapter in NATO alliance history. For the first time, NATO enacted Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, which specifies that an attack on one NATO member represents an attack on all alliance members.[1] As positive a step as that was, Article V does not require that NATO members contribute actual military assets to alliance defense, much less participate in interventions outside NATO auspices.[2] Indeed, we have already witnessed significant alliance disagreements over NATO's role in Afghanistan and the U.S. decision to launch the 2003 Iraq war. As a result, no one can know with certainty the extent to which NATO members ultimately will contribute to the fight against terrorism, to say nothing of NATO member contributions to non-Article V conflicts around the world.

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[1] The alliance initially invoked Article V on September 12, 2002, subject to confirmation that the attacks on the U.S. were directed from abroad. The alliance made Article V fully operative on October 2, 2002.

[2] Article V obligates members to "assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

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This study sheds light on how students of foreign policy can in fact explain, and perhaps even predict, how democratic states will behave when choosing whether or not to participate in future military conflicts. One approach might be to compare the predictions of existing foreign policy theories with actual conflict behavior. The advantage here is that hypothesis testing is relatively straightforward if one is using parsimonious theories. Yet sparse theories often miss relationships among variables unless interactive terms are included in the analysis. Even then, testing interactive terms usually requires large data sets that are difficult to compile and can fail to explain convincingly the manner in which variables are interacting. An alternative approach is to use an integrative model to explain conflict decisions. Integrative models arguably better reflect the multifaceted nature of real-world decisions. They also have the potential to advance debates by building bridges across theories. The biggest drawback with integrative models, however, is their lack of parsimony, which can lead to difficulties with testing unless the relationships between their component variables are carefully specified.

I use both approaches to explore support for NATO's 1999 *Operation Allied Force* in Kosovo by the alliance's five most influential members: France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S. In a traditional vein, I explore the reasons for variation in support for NATO's intervention using four relatively sparse, existing approaches to foreign policy analysis: theories of collective action, balance of threat neorealism, public opinion, and government institutional structures. As an alternative, I introduce a simple, integrated, decision-making model that incorporates the core concepts from each existing explanation in a staged, conditional manner. I then apply all five models to the Kosovo conflict. In doing so, I divide the Kosovo conflict into pre-NATO summit and post-summit phases. For each phase, I compare the support for intervention by the aforementioned NATO states and the predictions of the existing and integrated models. I find that three of the four existing theories do a fair job of explaining conflict behavior during Kosovo. The integrated model, however, does an even better job. Moreover, the integrated model is applicable to other conflicts, as a brief application to the original 1991 Gulf War demonstrates.

These findings have implications on at least three fronts. First, the results advance the ongoing debate over the determinants of state behavior during conflicts, as well as the debate over state contributions to coalition warfare. Second and related, these results reveal the extent to which domestic variables influence alliance member behavior compared with more traditional approaches, such as realism, and as important, they reveal how domestic and international variables interact to further our understanding of conflict behavior. Third and finally, practitioners armed with these results should have the means to anticipate and perhaps minimize intra-alliance disputes over future military interventions in the war on terrorism or against rogue states.

The next section situates this study in the existing literature, discusses case selection and defines the dependent variable. The second section summarizes the core hypotheses of the four competing explanations and introduces the integrated decision model as an alternative. The third section reviews each NATO member's behavior during the conflict in terms of both material and political contributions to the allied effort. The fourth section assesses these data. The concluding section discusses the implications of my findings for international relations theory and policy practitioners.

Study Parameters

There are only a handful of recent works that discuss the theoretic reasons why states might exhibit diverging levels of support for alliance or coalition interventions. This is somewhat surprising, in that there is a vast literature on alliances. A review, however, reveals that scholars have focused on a number of different

questions from that posed here. There are extensive literatures on alliance formation (Walt, 1987; Sandler, 1993; Niou and Ordeshook, 1994; Reiter, 1994; Lake, 1996; Christensen, 1997; Lai and Reiter, 2000), alliance duration (McCalla, 1996; Bennett, 1997; Wallander, 2000), the effects of alliances on general foreign policy behavior (Kim, 1989; Sorokin, 1994; Mansfield and Bronson, 1997), and on alliance burden sharing (Boyer, 1989; Oneal and Elrod, 1989; Jones and Thompson, 1990; Oneal, 1990; Murdoch and Sandler, 1991; Oneal and Diehl, 1994; Goldstein, 1995). None of these literatures directly addresses my topic of interest. Of these, works on burden sharing come closest but do so by documenting inequalities in peacetime defense spending among NATO allies.

The exception is a study by Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger (1994), which examined competing explanations of state contributions to the 1991 Gulf War. Their article tested five competing models of foreign policy, including theories of collective action, balance of threat realism, alliance dependence, societal pressure, and bureaucratic politics. A gross simplification of their complicated findings is that external pressures helped explain whether or not a state contributed to the Gulf War military coalition and domestic factors helped explain the form that such contributions took.[3]

Using a methodology similar to Bennett et al., the empirical portion of this study examines support for *Operation Allied Force* by France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S.[4] The Kosovo case is interesting for a number of reasons. For students of foreign policy, the Kosovo case is a partial test of whether Bennet et al.'s *overall* findings are applicable to more formal alliance relationships operating under different decision-making rules than existed during the Gulf War.[5] For practitioners, the 1999 Kosovo conflict holds potential clues as to NATO decision making in future out-of-area missions. At the time, the Kosovo intervention was a landmark event for the NATO alliance. It was the largest sustained military operation in NATO history and the alliance's first war. It also was the alliance's first major military intervention outside alliance territory, and represents the most recent time that a majority of alliance members collectively used force.[6] Perhaps most importantly, like the fight against terrorism and modern wars of choice, the Kosovo intervention was essentially a "coalition of the willing" aimed at stopping abhorrent behavior (ethnic cleansing rather than terrorism) and protecting innocent civilians (Kosovars rather than NATO citizens).[7]

Having a coalition of the willing does not guarantee unanimity, however. As I show below, NATO countries tried to portray a seemingly unified front to the international community during the Kosovo conflict. Yet that unity masked significant differences of opinion among alliance members on such issues as whether and how to escalate the air campaign and whether to start a ground offensive when the air campaign failed to produce immediate results. This behind the scenes disunity did not come without a price. Because NATO decisions require unanimity among all members, alliance military behavior had to conform to the preferences of the

[3] Bennett et al. (1994:40) write that "internal constraints account better for [a state's] ability to contribute and the form that such contributions take."

[4] I include France because it remains a member of the alliance's supreme decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council, though it formally withdrew from the Alliance's integrated military structure in 1966.

[5] This is only a partial test of Bennet et al. (1994) because (1) I examine similar but not identical theories to those used in the earlier study, as detailed below; (2) the Gulf War represented a local and *strategic* threat in a way that was not matched by Kosovo; and (3) intra-coalition dependence on the U.S. was very different in 1991 compared to 1999, as I discuss in a note below.

[6] NATO members have contributed since to peacekeeping in Afghanistan, but only the U.S. and Britain contributed forces during the most active fighting against the Taliban and al Qaeda forces.

[7] The North Atlantic Council took formal action to authorize *Operation Allied Force*, but alliance members were allowed to opt out of participation.

most cautious NATO members.[8] The resulting slow, halting escalation arguably prolonged the Kosovo conflict and the suffering of hundreds of thousands of Kosovars, and strained relations among NATO's core members.[9]

Four criteria guided the selection of states for this study. First and most importantly, I selected NATO members to ensure significant variation in the four explanatory variables of interest.[10] As we will see, the five states chosen possess a broad range of military and economic power, faced different threats, have populations holding varying beliefs regarding military interventions, and have differently structured governmental systems. Second, the five countries represent the core of the alliance's political leadership. As a result, consensus among the five members is often sufficient to sway the remaining members of the alliance, while dissention among the five has led to past inaction (i.e., pre-1995 Bosnia).[11] In short, these are the states that had and will continue to have the most impact on NATO interventions in the Balkans and elsewhere. Third, I only selected NATO members. My goal is to explain variations within the alliance in support for intervention rather than accounting for the effect of alliance membership on that support. The latter study would require a representative sample of alliance members and non-aligned nations. Instead, here I explore how competing international and domestic factors help explain variations in intra-alliance support for intervention. Fourth, and finally, practical research concerns played a role in selecting these countries. Relatively detailed data were available on each nation in this study. The same was not true of most other NATO members.

The dependent variable for this study is the relative support for military intervention by NATO members during the Kosovo conflict. I measure support for intervention in two ways, because *Operation Allied Force* contained aspects of both brute military force and coercive diplomacy. It was brute force in the sense that efforts were made to defeat Serb forces on the ground, both to stop them from attacking civilians and to degrade their capabilities to attack NATO forces. The operation also was an example of coercive diplomacy in the sense that NATO's slow escalation attempted to compel Serb capitulation without having to invade and occupy the country. The dual purposes of the Operation highlight the importance of actual military forces that contributed to the campaign and to the perception (justified or not) of NATO's will to use those forces.

I review each alliance member's material contribution to the Kosovo air campaign; the relative aircraft *capabilities* devoted to the conflict and the ground forces promised by each state.[12] Diplomatic and political activities also are an important signifier of support. As a result, I explore the relative *willingness* of each state to use force as articulated in official statements, press reports, biographies, and secondary accounts. I rely on this diverse set of sources to avoid basing my assessments on just public speeches or one individual's interpretation of events. At the same time, I assume that not all talk is cheap, especially during a high-stakes intervention whose success depends on negotiations with long-term alliance partners. The rhetoric states use, and the promises they make, may be particularly important in

[8] The February 2003 dispute over aid to Turkey vis-à-vis a possible Iraqi attack was another example. The unanimity requirement holds only for Alliance operations formally authorized by the North Atlantic Council. It may not hold for smaller coalitions of the willing that do not have formal NAC authorization. In practice, many NATO members take their cues from NATO's five most powerful members: France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S. This translates into an informal unanimity requirement among the big five for NATO action. For commentary on the requirement for unanimity, see: Bradley Graham, "Air Power 'Effective, Successful,' Cohen says," *Washington Post*, June 11, 1999, p. 28; "Interview with Gen. Wesley Clark," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, July 7, 1999.

[9] Even Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:164), who lay most of the blame for the halting NATO campaign on the U.S., seem to agree when they write that "Decisions were made only carefully and gradually, in the interests of maintaining solidarity." See also (Nye, 1999; Rodman, 1999).

[10] King, Keohane, and Verba (1994:140) discuss this selection criteria.

[11] *Washington Post*, June 11, 1999, p. 28; *Jane's Defense Weekly*, July 7, 1999.

[12] I did not factor in the contributions of basing or over-flight rights, given that there is no acceptable standard to compare basing rights vs. aircraft deployed or ordnance dropped.

such coercive circumstances because it influences the expectations of allies and adversaries.

Although the states examined were not selected according to their support for intervention (my dependent variable), their selection does in effect truncate the range of that dependent variable. Specifically, all states included in the analysis participated in the air campaign. The same was not true of the alliance as a whole, in that five of NATO's 19 members made no military contribution to Operation Allied Force.[13] More important, none of the 14 participants withdrew from the ongoing operation.[14] Constraining the dependent variable in this way may inadvertently bias my results, in that what I categorize as relatively weak support for the campaign was in fact better than abstaining or withdrawing from the campaign.[15] This bias would be more significant if my dependent variable was overall NATO behavior. It is not. Instead, I am examining *relative* state support for NATO intervention, and on that score many of the nations included in this study could and often did veto alliance decisions, demonstrating a wide range of support.

I make observations of each state during two phases of the conflict instead of assuming that state support was static throughout the conflict. The first phase runs from the beginning of air strikes through the NATO summit (3/24/99–4/24/99). The second phase runs from the NATO summit to the eventual Serb capitulation (4/25/99–6/10/99).[16] Considering the conflict in two phases allows for changing domestic and international circumstances, such as in public support or levels of threat. I do not assess member state support for the initiation of *Operation Allied Force* because of the widespread belief that the Serbs would capitulate quickly, just as they had in October 1998.[17] As important from a research perspective, there are significant gaps in evidence from early 1999, particularly regarding country-specific European support for intervention and European public opinion, making it impossible to adequately test the competing explanations.[18]

Explanatory Variables

My goal in this project is to explain the divergence in support for Operation Allied Force by core NATO members. To do so, I explore four established causes of foreign policy behavior and then a composite, integrated model.[19] Two explanations

[13]It would have been difficult if not impossible for four of these five countries to participate. Iceland and Luxembourg had no assets to contribute. Aircraft from the Czech Republic and Poland were not yet fully interoperable with other NATO assets (Hungary, the other new NATO member, used four aircraft to patrol its border with Serbia). That said it was somewhat surprising that the new NATO members did not contribute more, particularly in terms of ground troops, given that they expressed a willingness to contribute during the NATO enlargement negotiations. Greece refused to participate. See Migdalovitz (1999).

[14]Note that it would have taken an active and unanimous vote to formally end *Allied Force* once begun.

[15]See King, Keohane, and Verba (1994:129–132).

[16]The summit was when many NATO members realized fully that losing the war in Kosovo might lead to the end of NATO as a viable security organization. Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:3) write that the NATO summit "represents the best dividing line between losing and winning the war." For similar comments also see pp. 138–139. Clark (2001) takes a similar view.

[17]For comments on these expectations, see Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:18).

[18]For public statements from this period by these three governments, see Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:417, 477–478, 513, 516–517, 536–538, 607, 615, 666–670, 689–693, and 702).

[19]I depart from Bennet et al. (1994:44–45) in not considering their theory of alliance dependence as an explanatory variable. They argue that strong dependence on a dominant alliance partner will increase an ally's contribution to coalition war fighting because that ally fears abandonment more than entrapment in unwanted conflicts. Their theory is not necessarily applicable in the Kosovo case, in that the Clinton administration was not about to abandon the NATO allies. After all, the administration instigated NATO enlargement, was in the process of rewriting the NATO Strategic Concept to allow for out-of-area interventions by coalitions of willing NATO members, and had provided the impetus for NATO's 1995 action in Bosnia and took the lead at the Dayton Accords. As important, the U.S. government had pushed for stronger NATO actions against Serbia throughout 1998. In short, by 1999 it was widely known that maintaining a strong NATO alliance was an administration priority. Abandonment of the NATO allies was not seen as a viable U.S. option. For background, see Auerswald and Auerswald (2000) and Defense Department (2000).

focus on international-level variables while two focus on domestic attributes. The integrated model uses variables at both the international and domestic levels. I begin with explanations at the international level.[20]

Collective Action

In deciding which international factors might matter for the conflict behavior of alliance members, I borrow from previous discussions of alliance contributions and their focus on collective action theory. Theories of collective action begin with the premise that the existence of collective goods generates particular types of individual and group behavior. Collective goods have two core characteristics: they are provided *to* all if they are provided *at* all, and one's consumption of said good does not exhaust the supply of that good.[21]

The extent to which group members act to provide collective goods depends on a number of factors, the most important of which is group size.[22] More specifically, what matters is the size of the subgroup that is capable of providing the collective good themselves and would benefit from doing so even if no other group member contributed. Russell Hardin (1982:40–48) argues that the smaller this subgroup (or K-group as he calls it), the greater is the likelihood that the good gets provided. A small K-group fosters transparency, reduces coordination problems, and thereby decreases the chances of shirking among K-group members. The reverse is true with large K-groups, as each member waits for the others to act first. Hardin's conclusion builds on Olson's (1965:34) observation that "a collective good can often be provided by the voluntary, self-interested action of members of the group. In smaller groups marked by considerable degrees of inequality … there is the greatest likelihood that a collective good will be provided."

It is assumed that non-K-group members also will shirk. It is not that non-K-group members are indifferent to whether or not the collective good is provided. Rather, these members know that the benefits of the collective good in question cannot be denied to them even if they shirk, which is important if their contribution will not have a demonstrable impact or they do not value the collective good enough to bear the costs associated with a meaningful contribution. Either way, they simply do not want to pay for the collective good if someone else is willing to (Olson, 1965:14–16, 21). As Olson (1965:35) notes, there is a "surprising tendency for the 'exploitation' of the great by the small" when collective goods are at stake.

Asymmetries in perceptions of the collective good by group members can increase the chance of shirking by individual members. One such asymmetry is the notion that individual group members will reap different benefits from the provision of the collective good.[23] As Hardin (1982:17) notes, "Often, groups are asymmetrical, with some members valuing the group good more highly than others in the sense that they would be willing to pay more to see it provided or to see it provided at higher levels." A second and related asymmetry is created when the collective good in question is of a non-monetary, non-fungible nature, like respect

[20]The two international explanations—collective action and balance of threat—together capture many, though not all, of the dynamics that scholars and practitioners often associate with conceptions of the national interest, but in a way that avoids much of the controversy over prioritizing those interests. For an example, see Rice (2000). On the domestic side, I do not focus on the impact of specific individuals on policy decisions because of the difficulties associated with generalizing that impact across observations. Finally, though I recognize their importance, I do not explicitly examine the impact of national culture or historical context on foreign policy behavior, for reasons summarized by Mazarr (1996).

[21]Olson (1965). Russell Hardin (1982:17) calls these principles the impossibility of exclusion and the jointness of supply.

[22]Olson (1965:33–36). Hardin (1982:20–22) identifies individual entrepreneurship, the use of selective incentives, and extra-rational behavior as important additional factors in the provision of collective goods.

[23]See Olson (1965:28–29, 34). Hardin (1982:73–76) calls this an asymmetry of demand.

for human rights.[24] The inability to place an exact value on the good's provision predisposes members to shirk when they are not demonstrably affected by the good's provision. An example might be the relative willingness to enforce clean air standards by polities living upwind and downwind of an air pollution source. The result of these two general perceptual asymmetries is that we would expect a wide variance in contributions by group members, with members who especially value the good contributing more than their group partners, particularly when the good deals with non-material issues such as international norms of behavior.

Application to Kosovo. There were at least two collective goods in question during the Kosovo conflict.[25] The first was stopping ethnic cleansing (or perhaps even genocide) in Europe.[26] A second collective good being threatened was the continuation of the NATO alliance as a viable security institution. NATO inaction or failed action would be a severe blow to NATO credibility.[27] And while some argued that the alliance had outlived its usefulness, there was still widespread consensus at the time in official circles that the alliance served a useful purpose in maintaining European stability and fostering democratization in Eastern Europe. As Gen. Clark noted: "NATO could likely not have survived [failure] in its present form, and a wave of fear and insecurity would have raced through Eastern Europe."[28]

Great powers had much greater capabilities during this conflict with which to provide collective goods than did their less powerful partners. That fact helps determine whether any particular state could have been a member of a K-group regarding the collective goods in question. Consistent with other applications of collective action theory to international behavior, I measure state power using gross domestic product (GDP) and military spending for the year preceding the conflict. As we are concerned with behavior during a relatively short military conflict, I place more emphasis on military spending whenever economic and military data yield different rankings of relative state power. The U.S. was by far the most powerful nation in terms of both GDP and military spending before the conflict. Indeed, American GDP was significantly larger than the combined total for the other four nations. The U.S. also spent twice as much on defense during 1998 as the other four nations combined. France, the U.K., and Italy maintained the same relative order, regardless of whether we compare GDP or military spending. Germany ranked second in terms of GDP but dropped to fourth on military spending and last when military spending was measured as a percentage of GDP. Data for the five NATO states appears in Table 1.[29]

[24]Hardin (1982:17).

[25]Other collective goods that could have been important to member behavior included the defense of the alliance or the continued territorial integrity of nation states. For our purposes, it is less important to identify the specific collective good at the forefront of each decision-makers' mind than it is to note that there was the impossibility of exclusion and jointness of supply associated with each of these collective goods. Hardin (1982:76) calls this an "asymmetry of content." He notes that such asymmetry does not produce uniform bias in group member behavior either for or against cooperation. The degree to which individual state leaders used one or another collective good as a rationale for state action is more a matter of political rhetoric than it is a sign that their state would (or would not) have benefited from the provision of that collective good.

[26]See Defense Department (2000:3–4) and Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000: 19, 106).

[27]Defense Department (2000:4).

[28]Clark (2001:xxiv). Also see Clark (2001:422) and Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:132, 140, 160).

[29]GDP figures are standardized according to purchasing power parity (PPP). See CIA, "World Fact Book, 1999" excerpts reprinted in *The World Almanac, 2001* (New Jersey: World Almanac Education Group, 2001), p. 132. Defense budget totals are from International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance* (Oxford University Press, 1999). Military spending as a percentage of GDP is from www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb090804.htm and in non-U.S. cases may not correspond exactly to the other entries given differences in scoring between sources.

TABLE 1. Military and Economic Assets, 1998 (in Billions of U.S. Dollars)

	U.S.	*France*	*U.K.*	*Germany*	*Italy*
Defense expenditures (in billions)	270.2	40.6	37.4	33.0	23.1
Defense as a % of GDP	3.1	2.8	2.7	1.5	2.0
GDP/PPP (in billions)	8,511	1,320	1,252	1,813	1,181

GDP, gross domestic product; PPP, purchase power parity.

Based on power alone, a collective action approach would expect that the U.S., NATO's most powerful member, would have been much more willing to provide collective goods even if force was necessary to do so, and then escalate as necessary, compared with its weaker European partners. By the same token, stronger European states (i.e. England and France) should have been more willing to use force than were their weaker partners (i.e. Germany and Italy).

The non-quantifiable nature of the collective goods in question to some extent reinforces the previous point regarding power capabilities as a surrogate measure of K-group membership during the conflict. Specifically, each great power alliance members may have had individual incentives to provide the collective good (whether it was to prevent ethnic cleansing or to maintain NATO as a viable institution) given that great powers stood to lose the most if such status quo norms were challenged successfully. That is, their power position may have caused them to value these collective goods differently than might lesser powers.

Yet the very non-quantifiable nature of the goods in question should further refine the expected behavior of states beyond that associated with simple relative state power. We would expect states that had a history of strongly valuing the collective goods in question to behave differently than states that did not value the goods to the same extent. Here the biggest distinction among states arises with regard to the value associated with NATO's continued viability and the willingness of states to use force to preserve that viability. Two states stand out on that score. Of all the states in question, the French seemed the least committed to NATO, both in terms of their willingness to withdraw from the alliance's military committee and in their desire for an independent European security force as a counterweight to the U.S.-led NATO. Conversely, past British behavior throughout the Cold War, during the Bosnian conflict, and with regard to an independent European force suggests that the British place a higher value on the NATO alliance than perhaps any other European ally. Overall then, a collective action approach would expect the Americans to be strongly in favor of using force to provide the collective goods in question, moderately strong British support for using force, moderately weak French support, and weak German and Italian support for combat.

Balance of Threat

This variant of neorealism posits that alliances form as a balancing mechanism, not due to inequalities in relative power but instead as a response to threats faced by individual states.[30] The greater the threat faced by a state, the more likely it is to enter an alliance because balancing via alliances helps prevent the rise of a regional or global hegemony while also increasing one's influence with alliance partners.[31] In Stephen Walt's original formulation, threat assessments included the intentions, offensive potential, and aggregate power of would-be antagonists and to a lesser extent the geographic proximity of a state to a threat.[32] Balance of threat theory can be extended to

[30]This discussion is based on Walt (1987).
[31]Ibid, pp. 18–19.
[32]Ibid, pp. 22–26, 178–180.

questions of allied contributions to military conflicts if we assume that threatened states in pre-existing alliances will contribute to an intervention that lessens that threat.[33]

At least two specific propositions flow from balance of threat theory. First, alliance members facing little or no threat should avoid intervention. This is because less-threatened "status quo states can take a relatively sanguine view of threats … because one's allies will resist threatening states out of their own self-interest."[34] States facing significant threats will contribute/intervene.[35] Second, the exceptions to this rule are that very weak states will bandwagon, not balance, with a great power adversary or with whichever side appears to be winning late in a conflict.[36]

Application to Kosovo. Applied to NATO actions in Kosovo, balance of threat theory might expect states that feared an attack from Serb forces, whose territory was in range of Serb forces, or who faced a potentially destabilizing influx of refugees to be most in favor of intervention. Of the five states considered, Italy should have been a moderate proponent of intervention. Although Italy's survival was not at stake, it could have been subject to perhaps hundreds of thousands of refugees crossing the Aegean from Albania if ethnic cleansing were to succeed. Moreover, absent intervention, Italy could have been at risk from future Balkan instability.[37] Finally, we would expect Italy to make an increasingly strong contribution late in the conflict, as it appeared more certain that NATO victory was only a matter of time. Germany also should have supported intervention, if in a somewhat more restrained manner than Italy, since the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo might add significant numbers of refugees to the 85,000 Bosnians, 10,000 Albanians, and 83,000 Kosovars that had fled to Germany between 1995 and 1999.[38] In contrast, we would expect the U.K., France, and the U.S. to have been less willing to contribute to a NATO effort.

The next two explanations focus on the domestic level. There are theoretical and empirical reasons to expect that domestic political calculations influenced NATO members' support for intervention.[39] The question remains as to the extent of that influence and its origins. In their 1994 study, Bennett et al. focused attention on state–societal relations and bureaucratic politics as explanations of coalition behavior during the Gulf War. I focus on two slightly different variables—public opinion and government institutional structure—that capture some of the same dynamics as those used in the earlier study but in ways that are arguably less subject to differing interpretations and coding ambiguity.[40] The public opinion approach

[33]This assumption is supported by evidence that states balance against threats when they can join with potential allies. Being NATO members satisfies the latter condition.

[34]Walt (1987:27).

[35]Ibid, pp. 29–30.

[36]Ibid, p. 29.

[37]The threat of refugee inflows would remain even if NATO could end the conflict relatively quickly, but they would be at a much reduced level. Given Italian and NATO defenses and air superiority vis-à-vis Serb aircraft, and Serbia's lack of ground-based weapons systems with the 300 km range to reach Italian territory (its SSC-3/Styx missile had a range of only 80 km) it was unlikely that Italy itself would have been attacked. No documentation exists as to whether any NATO country feared terrorist attacks from Serbian agents in the event of NATO intervention.

[38]See www.germany-info.org/info/press/releases/051099.html.

[39]See Defense Department (2000:xviii). Theoretic antecedents for domestic explanations of alliance policy include: Freedman (1988); Barnett and Levy (1991); David (1991); Groth and Crandall (1991).

[40]I know of no readily accepted standards for coding the effects of bureaucratic politics. Consider that one's baseline expectation of what a rational unitary actor would do depends on one's theoretic orientation (realist, liberal, etc.) or at least on one's estimation of the chief executive's theoretic orientation. Assessing the effects of bureaucratic politics then requires knowing the preferences of each bureaucratic actor in that state, gathering detailed information as to the decision-making processes in each particular state, and estimating the relative intra-governmental power of each bureaucratic actor. Finally, one must then judge whether a state's deviation from the expected behavior of a unified actor can be attributed to bureaucratic politics or to some other independent variable. Similar, though less extreme, ambiguity surrounds the question of whether a state qualifies as "strong" or "weak" (or something in between) vis-à-vis societal pressure, particularly as we move from economic to security affairs.

used here explores the extent to which societal preferences shape government policy. The institutional structure approach explores how intra-governmental politics shapes foreign policy.

Public Opinion

Although there is no single, universally accepted theory on the relationship between public opinion and the use of force, one variant of this somewhat diverse literature would argue that government decisions in democracies represent the opinions of their society, or at least the views of a majority of the electorate.[41] This "bottom-up" perspective—i.e. public preferences determine foreign policies—would predict that the stronger the public aversion to conflict, the less adventuresome their country's conflict behavior will be. Conversely, state leaders should be more willing to use force were the public to strongly support such action.

Application to Kosovo. Public support for the Kosovo campaign was strongest in the U.K. and France, followed by Germany, the U.S., and then Italy. This ranking is based on broad opinion trends rather than comparing individual countries on a day-by-day basis because I drew on data from a number of different polling organizations using slightly different question wording and sample size.[42] The following summarizes the opinion data. Details for each country are displayed in the Appendix.

The available evidence suggests that the British and French publics strongly supported NATO's intervention. British support for the campaign started in the high 60s, climbed above 70 percent, and then gradually declined back into the mid 60s following the NATO summit. Questions on the U.K.'s involvement in the campaign generated similarly high levels of support, particularly in the first half of the conflict. French opinion followed the same trend with a similar magnitude. In addition, a majority of the British public always looked favorably on the government's handling of the crisis. And finally, British support for a ground invasion roughly doubled over the first 2 weeks of the campaign, peaking in the mid 60s before leveling out at slightly over 50 percent for the remainder of the conflict. French support for the ground option was of similar magnitude for most of the conflict. If overall British and French behavior was tailored to public support, we would expect both countries to strongly support a combined air and ground campaign, particularly during the buildup to the NATO summit. Polls would suggest continued support for the air campaign after the summit, although calls for the use of ground troops would be expected to subside somewhat from pre-summit levels.

German popular support for the campaign was surprisingly strong. After demonstrating an initial reluctance to use force, roughly 60 percent of respondents supported the NATO air campaign from early April through mid May. Support declined substantially in late May. Support for German involvement in the NATO intervention also remained near 60 percent for most of the conflict. At the same time, German respondents displayed little enthusiasm for a ground invasion, with the available data showing support hovering around 30 percent. Again, based solely on opinion polls, we would expect continuous German opposition to a ground campaign and an initial reluctance to launch air strikes, followed by support

[41]This simplification excludes the reverse causal argument that government policies shape public opinion. I also do not consider the possibility of a cyclical relationship between public opinion and elite behavior. Instead, my focus is on the extent to which public pressure influences foreign policy. See Russett and Graham (1989) for an overview.

[42]The number of publicly available polls taken in each country also varied tremendously. Far more poll data are available on U.S. opinion, for instance, than is available on Italian opinion.

for air strikes during the NATO summit, and then a push for a cease-fire by the end of May.

In the U.S., public support for the NATO campaign remained at or above 60 percent until a few days after the NATO summit, at which point support declined into the 50s for the remainder of the conflict. Support for U.S. involvement in and for the Clinton administration's handling of the crisis were also between 50 and 60 percent, with slightly higher numbers in the first half of the conflict compared with the post-summit period. Support for a ground invasion started quite low, and although it gradually increased it was never supported by a majority of respondents for more than a few days. Opinion polls would suggest that the U.S. would be an active proponent of the air campaign in the pre-summit period, with government enthusiasm declining somewhat as the conflict continued. We would also expect the U.S. to oppose the ground option throughout the conflict.

Publicly available polling data for Italy are sketchy at best. Available data show a gradual increase in support for the air campaign through late May, but the campaign was never supported by a majority (an early figure is in the mid-20 percent range with peaks in support only in the mid 40s). The public expressed strong support for the Italian government's handling of the crisis immediately after the NATO summit, although the country was evenly divided over participating in the air campaign at that time. Based solely on polls, we would expect the Italian government to object to the air campaign and be vehemently opposed to a ground intervention.

Government Institutional Structure

The last explanation explores how the relationship between chief executives and legislatures influences conflict behavior. Those who study government institutions and foreign policy present evidence that (1) the domestic circumstances confronting a chief executive influence that individual's conflict decisions, and (2) those circumstances vary predictably across democracies based on the structure of their domestic institutions of governance (e.g. whether they have a president, a prime minister, or both, a majority party or a governing coalition in the legislature, etc.).[43]

These arguments suggest that if we assume chief executives want to remain in office, one important part of their decisional calculus during conflicts will be how those entities with the power to terminate office tenure (the public and/or the legislature) will react to military conflict. Assuming that international failure risks domestic punishment, executives will become less adventuresome as they become accountable to more domestic actors or entities, each with the power to punish the executive. A similar process should occur as the domestic impediments to conflicts increase. The greater the chance of legislative meddling in conflict decisions, the less chance there is that the executive can do what it sees as necessary to win internationally, and the less adventuresome will be that executive. Domestic institutions vary predictably on these two scores according to whom the executive is accountable for office tenure as well as the extent to which the legislature can challenge the executive's conflict decisions. As a result, this school of thought argues that a particular state's support for conflict should correspond to its fit within broad categories of democratic institutions.

Institutionally weak executives will be reluctant to use force because of domestic political calculations. Public or legislative opposition to force—or even the possibility of such opposition—should matter to domestically weak executives. After all,

[43]On the former point, see: Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller (1992); Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995); Smith (1996); Goemans (2000). On the latter point, see Auerswald (2000).

TABLE 2. Government Institutions and Expected Support

Country	*Government institutional structure*	*Expected support for intervention*
France	Strong Presidential	Strong
U.K.	Strong Parliamentary	Strong
U.S.	Weak Presidential	Moderate
Germany	Weak Parliamentary	Weak
Italy	Weak Parliamentary	Weak

the conflict might go badly and they could easily lose office as a result. To continue with force in such instances is to risk domestic punishment. This is true even if the public or legislature is in favor of conflict, because such weak executives cannot be sure of the future. They know that engaging in conflict is an internationally risky endeavor; if anything goes wrong the executive risks domestic defeat. As a result, they are likely to be extremely gun shy. Conversely, institutionally strong executives have more domestic policy leeway and should hesitate less before using force than would weak executives operating under tight governmental constraints.

Application to Kosovo. The five countries in question are displayed in Table 2 according to their domestic institutional structure and hypothesized support for intervention. The second column's listing of regimes as strong or weak signifies the strength of the executive vis-à-vis other government entities (legislatures or government coalition partners) rather than vis-à-vis society. As a result, the strong or weak designation does not correspond to that used in the traditional strong state/weak state literature. Instead, a strong executive is one that has few legislative constraints on his conflict behavior and risks fewer immediate domestic penalties for policy failure. Combined, institutionally strong executives confront less domestic risk when using force, and as a result are more willing to do so all else being equal.

Consider the five governments of interest in terms of legislative constraints and domestic penalties for failure. The French government is based on a premier-presidential system, where the president serves a fixed term of office and has broad foreign policy powers vis-à-vis the National Assembly. Foreign policy failure holds little immediate domestic peril for French presidents.[44] As a result, these institutionally strong presidents may see force as an attractive foreign policy instrument if presented with such a possibility. The British system features a prime minister with strong foreign policy powers but who is dependent on parliamentary confidence for office tenure. At the same time, British prime ministers usually represent a parliamentary majority party that only rarely turns on their leader. This combination of strong powers and few penalties gives British prime ministers significant domestic leeway to use force. U.S. government institutions give presidents a moderate amount of leeway when using force compared with their foreign counterparts.[45] Moderate leeway stems in part from a fixed term of office balanced by the fact that Congress can weigh in when presidents use force, particularly during extended conflicts, leading presidents to anticipate such behavior when crafting intervention policy.[46] In the American division of powers system then, a president must worry that divided government or public opposition to intervention will

[44]Macleod (2000).

[45]Presidents have less leeway in the domestic arena because domestic policies more often determine the distribution of government funds, which creates natural public constituencies and is one of Congress's enumerated powers.

[46]See Auerswald and Cowhey (1997).

embolden congressional critics and cause them to place constraints on long-term military action. Based on U.S. government institutional structure, American presidents should be less supportive of using force than their British or French counterparts. Finally, leaders in both Germany and Italy often are beholden to fragile parliamentary coalitions, making force a risky option for those institutionally weak leaders.[47] This constellation of powers suggests ranking NATO countries in the following order, from most to least supportive of intervention: France and the U.K., the U.S., and then Germany and Italy.

Integrated Decision Model

Figure 1 presents an integrated decision-making model as an alternative to the aforementioned theories, each of which examines only one facet of what are complex decisions by state leaders. The integrated model combines levels of analysis, is consistent with each of its component part's core arguments, and covers a wide range of behavior. Finally, the model is relatively simple, requiring three straightforward assumptions. I assume that a collective good is valued highly by at least some group members and could be provided by military intervention. I assume that elected leaders want to maintain office. Finally, I assume that no group member's survival is threatened, an assumption consistent with the vast majority of contemporary interventions of choice by western powers.[48]

The integrated model begins with the aforementioned government institutional model and its focus on the relationship between chief executives and legislatures. The integrated model agrees with the reasoning that institutionally weak executives should be reluctant to use force because of domestic political calculations. Their weak position leads them to be more concerned over their own political future than with their country's geo-strategic interests. As a result, they will be extremely cautious of military conflicts, even if there are domestic calls for action. After all, today's public or legislative support for conflict could turn into tomorrow's opposition if the



FIG. 1. An Integrated Decision Model

[47]For background, see Rudolf (2000) and Cremasco (2000).

[48]Threats to survival should shift the relative emphasis away from the domestic-level variables toward the international level.

battle goes badly, with dire domestic political results for the executive who wants to maintain office. The integrated model's expectation, therefore, is that institutionally weak executives will provide only weak support for intervention (Outcome 1).

At the other extreme are institutionally strong executives. Here, the integrated model departs from the original institutional theory's proposition that institutionally strong chief executives *automatically* would be more likely to use force than would their institutionally weaker counterparts. Yet it is not self-evident that greater domestic leeway necessarily produces violent international behavior, as the original institutional theory argues. Strong executives with significant leeway could choose to negotiate just as easily as choosing to fight. The integrated model does agree that institutionally strong executives do not need to factor in their domestic circumstances—like public opinion—when making conflict decisions. For instance, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was a proponent of war with Iraq in 2003 despite significant public opposition to the idea. Instead, strong executives will base their decisions on international factors.

In deciding which international factors might matter for a state's conflict behavior, the integrated model turns to the predictions of collective action theory. Borrowing from collective action theory makes sense given that we are interested in a class of conflicts—interventions of choice—in which the survival of our democratic states of interest is not immediately threatened. Balance of threat theory thus is less instructive for the purpose of explaining how domestically strong executives react to international imperatives.

Remember from the above discussion of collective action that disparate levels of effort were particularly likely for groups in which some but not all members believe that they can influence the goods' provision and that they will reap significant benefits from the provision of the collective good and those benefits are hard to quantify. Those members who would benefit from the good's provision, and can make a difference to its provision, have an incentive to take action regardless of how other group members behave. They become K-group members. The integrated model thus would expect institutionally strong executives to fully support intervention if they value highly the collective good at stake and have the power to provide it (Outcome 4), and otherwise support the intervention only to the degree that costs could be kept below the value of the good potentially provided (Outcome 3). For more internationally powerful states that might equate to a moderate-to-weak amount of effort. Less internationally powerful states might only make a weak contribution.

Executives occupying an intermediate domestic position, such as American presidents, must engage in a delicate balancing act regarding both domestic and international factors. Of particular importance to such executives will be public sentiment (and by extension, legislative sentiment, if the legislature is attending to the public) on the use of force. The integrated model expects that on issues generating only weak public or legislative support (if not opposition), executives with moderate institutional strength will respond with a weak military contribution, regardless of whether or not the state values highly the issue at stake and has the means to achieve success (Outcome 1). On the other hand, when conflict has public and legislative support, international factors also should influence executive decision making. So a state can make a significant military contribution when attempting to provide a collective good, but only if it is a K-group member and only in ways that are supported domestically (Outcome 2).

Application to Kosovo. The integrated model has some significantly different predictions compared with the preceding theories. Domestically weak executives in Italy and Germany should be reluctant to use force, as the government institutional model would expect (Outcome 1). For both executives, the likely adverse domestic reactions to a possible international failure should outweigh the benefits associated with participating in an intervention. British and French leaders

occupy a significantly stronger domestic institutional position. Neither executive need worry about domestic factors in the short term. As a result, the behavior of these strong executives should be consistent with the predictions of collective action theory. At a bare minimum, both should have provided a moderate level of support for intervention. The British should support strongly NATO military intervention (Outcome 4) because as noted earlier the British place a high value on NATO's future viability, one of the collective goods at stake in the conflict. Although French officials may abhor ethnic cleansing, they clearly do not value NATO's future viability to the same extent as do the British. Thus, we would expect less robust support on France's part for the provision of the collective goods at stake (Outcome 3). Finally, American presidents have a moderate amount of domestic institutional strength. The integrated model would expect that American presidents only would contribute to the provision of collective goods when and in a manner consistent with the dictates of public (and by extension, legislative) approval. On issues with public and legislative support, the executive will make a strong contribution (Outcome 2). Absent public support, American presidents will make much less of a contribution (Outcome 1).

Table 3 displays expectations derived from the five models. Collective action theory would expect the U.S. to take the lead in the conflict, followed by the British, French, and Germans, with Italy expected to be the least supportive of intervention. Balance of threat theory changes the ordering of the five states, with Italy now being moderately supportive of intervention followed by Germany, then the other European states and the Americans being least supportive of using force. Considerations of public opinion yield predictions that are dependent on which part of the conflict one examines. The U.K. and France should strongly support intervention during both parts of the conflict. The U.S. should be moderately supportive of intervention, with Italy opposed to intervention. German opinion was the most volatile, yielding expectations of them being moderately supportive during the first half of the conflict and being opposed to force in the latter part of the conflict. The explanation based on government institutional structure would predict that the French and British would be most supportive of military intervention, followed by the Americans, and then the Germans and Italians, in that order. Finally, the integrated model would expect the British to contribute strongly as they highly valued the collective goods at stake, and a moderate French contribution as they did not value the collective good as strongly. The U.S. should contribute strongly on issues and in a manner supported by the public, but weakly otherwise. The Germans and the Italians should only provide weak contributions to the alliance effort.

The analysis that follows compares these predictions with state behavior during the pre- and post-summit periods of the Kosovo conflict. I review each state's military

TABLE 3. Expected Support for Using Force

	U.K	*France*	*Germany*	*Italy*	*U.S.*
Collective action	Moderate–strong	Moderate–weak	Weak	Weak	Strong
Balance of threat	Weak	Weak	Moderate–weak	Moderate	Weak
Public opinion	Strong	Strong	Moderate (pre-summit), weak (post-summit)	Weak	Moderate
Government structure	Strong	Strong	Weak	Weak	Moderate
Integrated model	Strong	Moderate–weak	Weak	Weak	Variable, depending on domestic support for the issue

contributions to Operation Allied Force as well as their private and public policy positions during the conflict. I then examine which of the five models best explains the overall pattern of state behavior. Finally, in the conclusion I discuss the policy implications for future interventions by the alliance and by coalitions of the willing.

Observed Behavior During Operation Allied Force

> It was a war waged by a 19 member alliance that habitually looked to the United States for leadership but ultimately made decisions on the basis of consensus. …We knew that we had to conduct the military operation in a way that held the alliance together, despite differing national perspectives that would be brought to bear. …What became increasingly clear to me was just how difficult the process of target approval was going to become. …Allied Force wasn't unfolding like the Gulf War or the military textbooks taught us.
>
> — Gen. Wesley Clark, SACEUR (retired)[49]

Material Contributions

Table 4 displays the material contributions to *Operation Allied Force* during the pre- and post-summit periods. The table includes physical contributions to the air campaign and promised troops for a possible ground intervention. The air component lists absolute contributions of each country, as measured by numbers of fixed-wing aircraft deployed, sorties flown by each country and strike sorties flown by each country. It also lists each country's relative contribution, as measured by the percentage of its aircraft inventory deployed to the area of operations and the percentage of NATO sorties and strike sorties flown by each nation.[50] The ground

TABLE 4. Physical Contributions to Allied Force (Pre → Post-Summit)

Country	*Total Aircraft Pre → post-summit [% of national arsenal]*	*Total Sorties [% NATO sorties]**	*Strike Sorties [% NATO strike sorties]**	*Ground forces deployed or pledged*
U.K.	46 → 48	1,950	1,105	54,000†
	[9.3 → 9.7]	[5.1]	[11.6]	
France	73 → 84	2,414	1,217	10–20,000‡
	[12.2 → 14.2]	[6.4]	[12.8]	
Germany	14 → 33	636	414	0
	[2.8 → 6.6]	[1.7]	[4.4]	
Italy	42 → 58	1081	618	0
	[12.4 → 17.1]	[2.8]	[6.5]	
U.S.	488 → 731	23,208	5,035	5,400§
	[7.7 → 11.6]	[62.0]	[53.0]	

*Percentage totals do not add to 100 percent due to omitted contributions from other NATO members.
†An additional 30,000 British reserves also would be activated.
‡Deployments would occur only in the year 2000 contingent on UN authorization.
§Task Force Hawk in Albania.

[49]Clark (2001:xxv, 188, 201, and 233 respectively).

[50]Deployment numbers are from Defense Department (2000:32 and 78) and Donfried (1999:3–5). U.S. sortie data are from Bowman (2000:5). European sortie data are from http://www.stratfor.com/crisis/kosovo/natoorderofbattle.htm, reprinted in Peters et. al. (2001:20). Definitions of what constitutes a strike sortie differ from source to source. My definition includes close air support (CAS), battlefield air interdiction (BAI), and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), all of which are arguably central to a wide range of strike missions. Total aircraft inventories for each nation are from International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (1999).

component of Table 4 includes troops deployed or promised for non-fixed wing air and ground operations in Kosovo and Serbia, but not forces devoted to humanitarian relief or stability operations in neighboring countries.

The data demonstrate that there was a wide range of both absolute and relative military contributions to the conflict. British deployments suggest their strong material support for the intervention. Although the U.S., Italy, and France contributed more aircraft, the British contributed almost as many aircraft as did the U.S. when measured as a percentage of each nation's aircraft inventories. Moreover, British aircraft were more advanced and more heavily utilized than were most other European contingents. The relatively large number of total sorties and strike sorties flown by British planes, compared with those flown by other European nations, bears this out. Finally and most importantly, the British pledged by far the largest contingent of ground troops to a NATO intervention, and they did so with no reservations attached to their use.

French deployments demonstrated less strong material support for the campaign. France contributed the second largest national contingent of aircraft after the U.S., and the second largest aircraft contingent when measured as a percentage of their national arsenal. The French also flew slightly more total and strike sorties than did the British. That said they were much less willing to commit ground forces to the intervention, delaying a possible ground deployment until early 2000 and then only contingent on UN authorization for any ground operations.

The Germans made a weak physical contribution to the campaign, consistent with their ambivalence toward using NATO force in non-Article V missions. They contributed by far the fewest total aircraft, the lowest percentage of any nation's aircraft inventory, and flew the lowest percentage of sorties (both total and strike) of the five NATO members. They also refused to commit ground troops to the conflict. Combined, their actions demonstrated very weak material support for the campaign.

Like the Germans, direct Italian participation in combat operations in Kosovo and Serbia was relatively limited. Although they sent a respectable number of aircraft into action compared with their European counterparts, and contributed the highest percentage of their aircraft inventory to the conflict of any NATO member, the Italians flew a modest number of total sorties, and a large number of these were devoted to the defense of Italian airspace rather than strikes into Kosovo or FRY territory. In addition, the Italians refused to commit ground troops to the conflict. What separates them from the Germans was the Italian willingness to allow NATO the use of Italian airbases. That said, the Italians' *direct* military contribution to the overall campaign was fairly limited.

Finally, the U.S. made the largest material contribution to the air campaign. The U.S. provided by far the lion's share of aircraft when measured in absolute terms and a moderate number when measured as a percentage of the overall U.S. aircraft inventory. American pilots conducted the majority of strike sorties using the most technologically sophisticated and capable airframes in the alliance, which increased the relative effectiveness of each U.S. strike sortie. The U.S. was far less impressive when it came to ground troops, however. Although they deployed the 5,400-person Task Force Hawk to Albania, complete with Apache helicopters and rocket launchers, the task force was never authorized to operate within Kosovo or FRY territory, nor were they deployed with the ground spotters necessary for effective operations. In sum, then, the combination of American air and ground deployments represented a moderately strong level of support for the overall campaign.

Policy Statements

The numbers from the previous section provide a first cut at differentiating the five NATO members. But as mentioned before, *Operation Allied Force* was a combination of brute military force and coercive diplomacy. Diplomatic statements therefore

TABLE 5. Political Support for Allied Force

Country	*Pre-Summit*	*Post-Summit*
U.K.	Yes on ground troops	Yes on ground troops
	No bombing pause	No bombing pause
	Rapid escalation	Rapid escalation
France	Troops with UN backing	Delay ground troops
	No bombing pause	No bombing pause
	Slow escalation	Moderate escalation
Germany	No ground troops	No ground troops
	Bombing pause	No bombing pause
	Slow escalation	Moderate escalation
Italy	No ground troops	No ground troops
	Bombing pause	Bombing pause
	No escalation	Slow escalation
U.S.	No ground troops	No ground troops
	No bombing pause	No bombing pause
	Moderate escalation	Rapid escalation

were as important a signifier of support for the operation and for the alliance's potential future behavior as were physical contributions. As a result, this section reviews the public and private statements by NATO member-state officials in support or opposition to *Allied Force*. The overall results are displayed in Table 5.

U.K. The British were consistent supporters of an accelerated NATO campaign. They argued for a rapid escalation of the air war and consistently pushed the alliance to use ground troops.[51] As Prime Minister Tony Blair noted in the House of Commons on March 29, "In my view, our response to these appalling acts [in Kosovo], far from halting or slowing the Allied action, must intensify it and see it through to a successful conclusion."[52]

The British were particularly far in front of their allies on the issue of ground troops during the first half of the conflict.[53] In an April 18 television interview, Blair expressed his support for a multicomponent war plan. He said, "I think it is extremely important to carry on the air campaign and intensify it. … We keep every single option under review."[54] Many in the press interpreted his statement as publicly raising the question of NATO ground troops. Until then, Blair had always emphasized that future policy must maintain alliance unity as its top priority. But over the next 2 days the British Defense Ministry and the Prime Minister discussed a ground invasion option with NATO commanders.[55]

British pressure for a ground attack met with objections from other NATO allies. In response, the British advanced the idea of ground intervention in a "semi-permissive" environment. This equated to a situation where fighting was still occurring in Kosovo but NATO ground forces could expect to meet little organized resistance.[56] The hope was that intervening in such an environment would

[51]Clark (2001:224); Richardson (2000).

[52]Reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:757). That day Blair put words to actions by increasing the British contingent in the air war by 13 planes.

[53]Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:132).

[54]Reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:871).

[55]Clark (2001:261 and 264).

[56]M. Gordon and C. Whitney, "Two Allies Press U.S. to Weigh the Use of Ground Forces," *New York Times*, April 22, 1999, p. 1. See also: G. Jones and B. Fenton, "Blair Paves Way for Ground Troops," *London Daily Telegraph*, April 22, 1999, p. 1.

decrease the number of troops required and by doing so reduce allied objections. Blair argued for a ground intervention in a series of private meetings with President Clinton immediately before the NATO summit, only to have the Americans reject the idea.[57] Despite U.S. pressure to remain silent, the British again made their case for a semi-permissive intervention at the summit, however obliquely. As Foreign Secretary Robin Cook noted on April 22, "We are not going to commit ground forces in a hostile environment; nor do we need to. …There may be circumstances in which Belgrade has not signed a formal treaty in which it may be appropriate to go in. But what is a permissive environment and what is an appropriate time to go in is a judgement that we can only make when that time comes."[58]

If the British were by far the strongest pre-summit advocate of quickly escalating the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, they remained a vocal proponent of escalation throughout the conflict's second half. In a May 7 letter to the British public, Blair stated, "We will follow this through and we will win. … There can be no compromise."[59] Consistent with Blair's remarks, Defense Chief Charles Guthrie notified Gen. Clark on May 12 that the British were willing to devote as many as 35–50 thousand troops to an invasion force.[60] Nor was Blair only speaking for his cabinet. The government's intervention plan was supported by back-benchers and opposition parties in parliament.[61]

The British continued to support a ground offensive throughout May, again advocating intervention in a semi-permissive environment.[62] They made an especially strong case for the ground option at a secret May 27 NATO ministerial meeting in Germany, involving defense ministers from France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S. At that meeting, Defense Minister George Robertson reiterated and increased the British commitment to a ground offensive, pledging 54,000 troops to the endeavor. This was a major commitment of resources that would require deploying the entire Army overseas and the call up of 30,000 reservists.[63] In sum, the British strongly supported rapid escalation and the use of ground troops.

France. Like the British, the French were in favor of an uninterrupted and escalating air campaign during the pre-summit period.[64] They also had a particular targeting philosophy. As they told NATO commanders in early April, they wanted to deter further Serbian atrocities by holding hostage dual-use targets in Serbia and Montenegro.[65] As a result, they reportedly vetoed escalating the overall campaign to include dual-use targets when asked for permission to do so on March 30.[66] Indeed,

[57]Clark (2001:268); and Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:137).

[58]Reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:880 and 882).

[59]T. Blair, "It Will Be Peace, On Our Terms," *London Times*, May 7, 1999.

[60]Clark (2001:299–300, and 302).

[61]See W. Hoge, "Blair Under Domestic Pressure on Ground Forces," *New York Times*, May 18, 1999; and "Blair Admits Decision Is Needed on Ground Troops Within Weeks," *London Times*, May 13, 1999.

[62]E. Schmitt and M. Gordon, "British Pressing Partners to Deploy Ground Troops," *New York Times*, May 18, 1999, p. 1; J. Fitchett, "NATO Backs Russian-Finn Mission on Kosovo," *International Herald Tribune*, May 18, 1999, p. 1; S. Pearlstein, "NATO Allies Divided on Path to Peace in Kosovo," *Washington Post*, May 18, 1999, p. 15.

[63]Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:157–158); Richardson (2000:150); Clark (2001:330); and P. Sherwell, D. Cracknell, and D. Wastell, "Blair Pledges 50,000 Men for Invasion," *London Sunday Telegraph*, May 30, 1999, p. 1. For background on the secret meeting, see: Steven Myers, "Cohen and Other Ministers Size Up Possible Invasion Force," *New York Times*, May 29, 1999.

[64]For instance, see the March 25 remarks by French Foreign Minister Vedrine, reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:735–737).

[65]Clark (2001:236).

[66]Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:106, 118).

President Jacques Chirac claimed after the fact that France painstakingly reviewed all NATO targets throughout the air war.[67] Wielding its veto power, the French objected to hitting targets that had both military and civilian uses, like bridges and the Serbian electrical system.[68] Throughout April and into May the French halted or delayed NATO missions that targeted Serb television stations and transmitters, the Serb electrical system, Socialist party facilities, and airfields in Montenegro.[69]

Immediately before the NATO summit, President Chirac spoke of the need for "additional means" to stop Serb instigated atrocities in Kosovo. This was reportedly a direct allusion to a ground intervention, although it is unclear how serious the French were, in part because French officials wanted UN approval before commencing with a ground war and that was unlikely given Russian objections to the intervention.[70] In short, the French were less enthusiastic about ground escalation than were the British and while they diplomatically supported the air campaign they did so in their own unique, and sometimes contrary, way. In sum, the French made a moderately strong diplomatic contribution to the pre-summit phase of the air war.

The French continued their guarded support for a ground offensive during the second half of the conflict, although taking nowhere near as activist a position as did the British. French Defense Chief Jean-Pierre Kelche had notified NATO command as early as May 12 that France would participate in a ground invasion with between 10 and 20 thousand troops, should such an intervention prove necessary.[71] They renewed that promise at the secret May 27 NATO ministerial meeting.[72] That said, the French were in no hurry to begin a ground campaign. In public comments in mid May, Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine was cool to the idea of a near-term ground offensive.[73] As planning moved forward in NATO circles, the French wanted any ground attack delayed until the spring of 2000, ostensibly to provide additional time to marshal their forces.[74]

The French also maintained their cautious escalation policy when it came to the air campaign. They continued to resist attacking dual-use targets into May, believing that such attacks would only decrease the chances of Serb capitulation. At the same time, they were unwilling to condone a pause in the bombing campaign. For instance, on May 22 the French announced that NATO air strikes would stop only when the FRY fully accepted G-8 demands. And while the French asked that NATO stop bombing targets in Northern Serbia as soon as the Serbs accepted the G-8 demands in principle on June 3, they also supported continuing the bombing campaign until Serb forces had peacefully withdrawn from Kosovo.[75] In sum, the French were more cautious than the British but more willing to escalate than were their other European allies. They provided moderately strong diplomatic support for the NATO intervention.

[67]Reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:1148–1150).

[68]Clark (2001:224); Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:124).

[69]Clark (2001:249, 255–256, 263-264, 274, and 299). See also: "Chirac Says He Spared the Bridges," *Washington Post*, June 11, 1999, p. 17.

[70]Gordon and Whitney, "Two Allies Press U.S.," *New York Times*, April 22, 1999, p. 1; also I. Phillips, "French Favor Kosovo Military Action," *Associated Press*, April 19, 1999. See also Macleod (2000:117–122), for details on French attitudes regarding UN authorization and the use of ground troops.

[71]Clark (2001:300–302).

[72]Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:158).

[73]C. Lockwood, "Germany Joins U.S. in Veto of Ground Force," *London Daily Telegraph*, May 19, 1999, p. 1; J. Fitchett, "NATO Backs Russian–Finn Mission on Kosovo," *International Herald Tribune*, May 18, 1999, p. 1.

[74]Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:162–163).

[75]Clark (2001:354). Also see Prime Minister Lionel Jospin's comments on June 4, reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:1085).

Germany. The Germans were less diplomatically supportive of intervention than were the British or the French during the first half of the conflict.[76] Like the French, the Germans were cautious when it came to striking dual-use targets and reportedly were unwilling to give blanket authorization for such attacks when asked to do so on March 30.[77] This is not to say that the Germans opposed the air campaign. They did not. Their public rejection of the April 6 Serb request for a temporary cease-fire is proof on that score. The promised Serb concessions, said the Germans, were insufficient to meet NATO demands.[78]

The Germans were in favor of ending the conflict as soon as possible, however. On April 14, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and National Security Advisor Michael Steiner traveled to Moscow with a diplomatic initiative aimed at ending the war. The resulting German–Russian proposal differed from NATO demands in two respects. It called for Serbian acceptance of the G-8 peace initiative, followed by UN administration of Kosovo authorized by a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution. This diverged from NATO's demand for operational control of any peacekeeping force. The German proposal also called for a 24-hour bombing pause as soon as Serb forces began withdrawing, presumably before the UN acted on the implementing resolution. Both points were rejected by the Americans (as well as the Serbians).[79]

Throughout the month of May, the Germans repeatedly signaled their strong opposition to using ground troops. In a joint appearance with President Clinton on May 6, Chancellor Schroeder noted, "There is no reason whatsoever to go in and change our jointly adopted strategy."[80] Defense Chief Hans-Peter von Kirchbach was quoted as warning NATO commanders on May 12 that a ground war "would be a big political problem in Germany."[81] As if to confirm von Kirchbach's warning, the German Green party caucus voted against ground troops and called for a pause in the bombing 2 days later.[82] This was an important signal of the domestic constraints facing Chancellor Schroeder's coalition government. Although Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was reportedly in favor of continuing with air strikes, he was a Green party member and ultimately beholden to his party's wishes.

Chancellor Schroeder resolved these internal discussions, at least temporarily, on May 19. In public remarks, he voiced his opposition to a ground invasion of FRY territory and vowed to block any NATO authorization for such a war. In Schroeder's words, "The Federal Government rejects the sending of ground forces. That is the German position supported unanimously by the members of the German Parliament."[83] He went on to note, however, that the German government as a whole opposed a pause in the bombing. "I think it is not just—to hear that the strategy ought to be altered or to be changed … when people talk about sending in ground forces or when they talk about a unilateral pause in air strikes."[84] Schroeder warned that Germany would veto any change in alliance policy on either score. In his words, "The strategy of the alliance can only be changed if all the

[76]See Rudolf (2000:131–144) for a similar perspective and background.

[77]Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:118).

[78]Chancellor Schroeder's statement to that effect is reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:798–799).

[79]Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:165–166).

[80]Reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:945).

[81]Clark (2001:300).

[82]R. Cohen, "In a Breach, German Party Backs Limited Halt in Kosovo Air War," *New York Times*, May 14, 1999, p. 1; also Rudolf (2000:138).

[83]Reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:986). See also: C. Lockwood, "Germany Joins U.S. in Veto of Ground Force," *London Daily Telegraph*, May 19, 1999, p. 1. Foreign Minister Fischer was later quoted as doubting whether the German parliament would approve German involvement in such an intervention, were it to occur. See J. Perlez, "German Pegs Quick Peace to the Role of Russians," *New York Times*, May 26, 1999.

[84]Reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:985).

parties involved agree on it, so I trust that NATO strategy is not going to be changed. I am against any change of NATO strategy.''[85]

German hesitancy would continue through the end of the air campaign. As negotiations on the military technical agreement began on June 3, the Germans asked NATO commanders to withhold bombing targets near cities, as an inducement to the Serbs to finalize their acceptance of NATO demands.[86] Their attitude on ground troops remained constant. They were vocal opponents of ground intervention. In sum, they displayed weak-to-moderate diplomatic support for Operation Allied Force during the post-summit period.

Italy. The Italians were the least diplomatically supportive of the five NATO governments. On the second day of bombing, the press reported an Italian desire for a temporary cease-fire to reopen negotiations with the Serbs.[87] Indeed, there were even reports that Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema had publicly said that the NATO campaign should be abandoned.[88] A day later, on March 26, the Italian Chamber of Deputies voted (388–188) to recommend that Italy cease participating in the bombing campaign.[89]

That vote may have motivated a March 28 call from General Mario Arpino, the Italian Chief of Defense, to Gen. Clark, in which Arpino ''called to warn me that if we tried to move ahead too quickly on targeting, then Italy might face another government crisis. Italy, he said, might be able to withstand only 3–4 days of bombing.''[90] The Italians repeated those concerns to Clark 3 days later, and expressed their objections to moving to dual-use targets.[91] Later in April, the Italian government reportedly expressed dismay when NATO aircraft struck a Serbian television station during the NATO summit, claiming that the Italians had never authorized such attacks.[92] Parts of the governing coalition again demanded that Italy withdraw from the air campaign.[93]

Italian behavior after the NATO summit reflected their desire to end the campaign as soon as possible. This was particularly true after the May 8 attack on the Chinese embassy. Two days after the attack, Italian President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro again objected to NATO strikes against civilian targets.[94] A week later in meetings with German Chancellor Schroeder, Italian Prime Minister D'Alema was reported to have repeatedly ruled out a ground offensive.[95] Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini also reportedly opposed a ground option and desired a bombing moratorium.[96]

Italian resolve weakened further when a parliamentary majority again demanded on May 19 that the government seek a halt in the bombing.[97] Soon after, the

[85]Reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:986–987). Also see: E. Schmitt, ''Germany's Leader Pledges to Block Combat on Ground,'' *New York Times*, May 20, 1999, p. 1.

[86]Clark (2001:350).

[87]Clark (2001:209). See also Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:739).

[88]Donfried (1999:5).

[89]Ibid. The government coalition included eight political parties, all with different recommendations on Kosovo. Cremasco (2000:165–180) provides good background and links Italian hesitancy to the fragile government coalition.

[90]Clark (2001:213).

[91]Clark (2001:228); Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:118).

[92]Reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:895 and 900).

[93]Cremasco (2000:172).

[94]W. Drozdiak, ''Bombing Breeds Allied Misgivings,'' *Washington Post*, May 11, 1999, p. 16.

[95]Lockwood, ''Germany Joins U.S. in Veto of Ground Force,'' *London Daily Telegraph*, May 19, 1999, p. 1. It is interesting to note that 1 day later the FRY government contacted the Italian president, accepting the G-8 demands with some reservations.

[96]Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:163); E. Schmitt and M. Gordon, ''British Pressing Partners to Deploy Ground Troops,'' *New York Times*, May 18, 1999, p. 1; D. Lynch, ''Cracks May be Showing in NATO Coalition,'' *USA Today*, May 19, 1999.

[97]Cremasco (2000:175).

Serbs agreed to G-8 demands with some reservations. D'Alema used that opportunity to announce that his government favored a bombing pause as soon as the UNSC began considering the G-8's demands, in effect before the UN acted and before Belgrade fully complied with those demands.[98] In explaining his actions at NATO headquarters the next day, D'Alema privately warned that a drawn out air campaign was the worst possible outcome from Italy's perspective. The campaign needed to end soon, one way or the other.[99] In a press conference later that day, D'Alema reiterated his call for a bombing pause to jump-start negotiations. Should negotiations fail, he only endorsed renewing air attacks against military targets.[100] Foreign Minister Dini went so far as to warn that a ground war would cause Italy to leave NATO.[101] Privately, Italian officials warned that they would contribute to a ground campaign only if the Serbs rejected a Security Council resolution incorporating the G-8 demands.[102]

The Italians escalated their commitment to the NATO campaign only after the Serbs again refused to agree to NATO demands in the latter part of May. This was most apparent in Defense Minister Carlo Scognamiglio's pledge at the secret May 27 NATO ministerial meeting to contribute ground troops should NATO decide to invade.[103] But even here, the Italians stopped short of advocating such an invasion.

In sum, the Italian government was a reluctant participant in the Kosovo campaign. The Italians repeatedly advocated halting or at least pausing the bombing campaign. They were against using ground troops until the end of May, at which point they only went so far as to withhold an Italian veto of the ground force option. This might have been an easy pledge to make at the time, knowing that the Germans had categorically and very publicly ruled out ground troops only a week earlier. In sum, overall Italian diplomatic support for the allied effort was somewhat weaker than that of Germany during the second half of NATO's military campaign.

U.S. During the first half of the air campaign, the U.S. was very much in favor of continuous bombing but opposed to using ground forces.[104] On the question of bombing, the Americans sought to control the pace of the campaign. The Clinton administration was against pauses for negotiations, as desired by the Germans, Italians, and some other members of the alliance.[105] In Clinton's words on April 5, "NATO will continue the air campaign. It will be undiminishing, unceasing, and unrelenting."[106]

The U.S. also objected to the Europeans' targeting philosophy and informed NATO commanders before the air war began that the administration wanted to review and approve all bombing targets.[107] The Americans wanted to bomb targets in Serbia proper as it became clear that the air war would not produce immediate results.[108] As the conflict progressed, the administration sped up its target approval

[98]E. Schmitt, "Germany's Leader Pledges to Block Combat on Ground," *New York Times*, May 20, 1999, p. 1; J Fitchett, "NATO Backs Russian-Finn Mission on Kosovo," *International Herald Tribune*, May 18, 1999, p. 1.

[99]Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:163).

[100]D'Alema's statements are reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:991–994).

[101]Cremasco (2000:175).

[102]S. Mufson, "NATO Races Against a Fraying Alliance," *Washington Post*, May 21, 1999, p. 28.

[103]Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:158).

[104]Clark (2001:165).

[105]Clark (2001:228).

[106]Reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:791).

[107]Clark (2001:178).

[108]During the first days of the campaign, the White House initially pushed for attacks on Serb forces in the field and disapproved strikes aimed at some Serbian infrastructure. The Defense Department opposed such attacks if they required low-flying aircraft like the Apache helicopter or the A-10 attack plane because such attacks violated the 15,000 ft flight floor enacted to prevent allied casualties during the air war. See Clark (2001:213, 224–225, 227).

process, with particular emphasis on strategic targets.[109] This directly contradicted the French desire for emphasis on tactical targets in Kosovo.

The administration immediately ruled out the use of ground troops and remained firmly opposed to a ground intervention until early June. In a March 24 televised address, President Clinton said "I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to start a war."[110] The president's words were indicative of a near consensus in Washington in the pre-summit period: avoid actions that could lead to an inadvertent ground war. So while that allowed for such things as the deployment of Task Force Hawk to Albania, the administration was not about to authorize using those Apache helicopters in combat, at least in the pre-summit period.[111]

The only change in administration rhetoric on ground forces came about in an effort to forestall British plans to raise the subject of a ground war during the NATO summit. The Clinton administration in mid April agreed to update planning for a ground option, although senior officials were careful to reiterate that, in the words of Secretary of Defense William Cohen, "the President has indicated he has no plans or intent to use ground troops."[112] Moreover, the Defense Department on April 19 succeeded in tasking NATO commanders with that planning, erecting a significant bureaucratic distance between ground plans and White House decision makers.[113]

The administration's resistance to a ground war was most apparent during the Clinton–Blair meetings before the NATO summit. The White House is reported to have categorically rejected the British call for a ground intervention, whether in a semi-permissive or hostile environment, and made it clear that the Americans wanted no mention of ground troops during the summit.[114] In an April 22 appearance with British Foreign Minister Cook, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright summed up the U.S. position with the following terse statement: "We do not favor the deployment of ground forces into a hostile environment in Kosovo."[115]

In sum, before the NATO summit the Clinton administration displayed moderate enthusiasm for the intervention. While they had resisted all calls for a pause in the bombing, they had opposed strongly the British suggestion of preparations for a ground offensive. Task Force Hawk and their Apache helicopters were in the process of being deployed, but that did not ensure their use. In short, the Clinton administration took a moderate position regarding the intervention: gradual escalation but no ground troops.

The administration was not the only part of the U.S. government opposed to a ground intervention. Congress was deeply ambivalent about U.S. involvement in Kosovo. On April 28, just days after the NATO summit, the House of Representatives considered four resolutions on the Kosovo conflict, the outcome of which sent a decidedly mixed message. The House overwhelmingly refused (2–427) to declare war against the FRY. They then defeated (139–290) a measure that required the president to withdraw U.S. forces within 30 days, but failed (213–213) to provide post hoc authorization for the air campaign. In other words, they refused either to approve or terminate the air campaign. The only measure the House supported (249–180) prohibited the president from deploying combat "ground elements" to Yugoslavia unless specifically authorized by law or when required to

[109]Clark (2001:235–236).

[110]Reprinted in Weller (1999:498). Similar statements by the president and other senior administration officials over the next week are reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:755, 781, and 790).

[111]Clark (2001:224, 227, and 230–233).

[112]Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:137). Cohen's April 12 remarks are reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:817).

[113]Clark (2001:263); Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:155–156); T. Lippman and B. Graham, "NATO Chief Asks Review of Invasion Planning," *Washington Post*, April 22, 1999, p. 1.

[114]Clark (2001:268).

[115]Reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:879).

rescue allied personnel. The final result was that the House opposed U.S. participation in a ground war while tacitly authorizing the ongoing air campaign.

The Senate added its voice to the domestic cacophony when Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Joseph Biden (D-DE) used a parliamentary maneuver to force consideration of a resolution on May 4 to grant the president the authority "to use all necessary force and other means" to accomplish NATO objectives in the Kosovo conflict. The resolution failed (22–78) in part because it raised fears of another open-ended Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Moreover, the administration itself opposed the bill, arguing, consistent with its summit statements, that it was premature to consider authorizing ground troops.[116]

There were signs that the administration realized its rhetoric on ground troops, and its actions to defeat the McCain–Biden resolution, might encourage Serbian intransigence. In mid May, the administration attempted to change its rhetoric.[117] Most notable was President Clinton's May 18 statement, in which he said, "I don't think we or our allies should take any option off the table, but we ought to stay with the strategy we have and work it through to the end."[118] That this was a rhetorical change at best was evident that same day when a National Security Council spokesman remarked in reference to ground troops, "The U.S. position is clear. We're steadfast against this."[119]

The substance of American policy changed very little throughout May. The Clinton administration continued to resist British calls for intervention in a semi-permissive environment. From the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) perspective, the risks associated with a ground war were still too high. As such, they recommended that the president withhold authorizing the use of the Apache helicopters, a recommendation Clinton accepted on May 18.[120] The next day, Gen. Clark warned National Security Advisor Sandy Berger that a ground intervention had to be authorized by June 1 if it was to begin before the onset of winter weather. Berger asked that a decision be postponed until June 15, because, "We're not ready here."[121] Defense Secretary William Cohen reaffirmed administration hesitancy when he rejected a ground offensive during the secret May 27 NATO ministerial meeting in Germany.

It was not until June 2 before Berger argued to the president that a ground invasion must occur if NATO air strikes failed. Clinton is reported to have agreed with Berger's assessment.[122] That did not mean, however, that the administration believed the strikes had yet failed, or that the Americans could persuade the other allies to begin a ground war. In Secretary Cohen's words that same day, "There is a consensus for a strong air operation in the NATO countries. There is not a consensus for a ground operation in a non-permissive environment. So we intend to focus on the positive."[123] The U.S. never did authorize the ground invasion. One day later the Serbs agreed in principle to NATO demands, at which point the White House

[116]N. Kempster, J. Dahlburg, and J. Wilson, "Ethnic Cleansing Is Unstoppable, Top NATO Official Says," *Los Angeles Times*, May 5, 1999.

[117]Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:156).

[118]Reprinted in Auerswald and Auerswald (2000:982). See also: J. Harris, "Clinton Says He Might Send Ground Troops," *Washington Post*, May 19, 1999, p. 1; J. Perlez, "U.S. Discounts Discord for Sake of Talks," *New York Times*, May 20, 1999; C. Robbins and T. Ricks, "NATO Weighs Plan for Bigger Kosovo Force," *Wall Street Journal*, May 19, 1999; J. Fitchett, "NATO Backs Russian–Finn Mission on Kosovo," *International Herald Tribune*, May 18, 1999, p. 1.

[119]E. Schmitt and M. Gordon, "British Pressing Partners to Deploy Ground Troops," *New York Times*, May 18, 1999, p. 1.

[120]Clark (2001:313, 319). JCS Chairman Henry Shelton reportedly told Clark that "Washington wanted to pull back on anything that looked like we might be heading incrementally into a ground war." See Clark (2001:303).

[121]Quoted in Clark (2001:310). See also M. Binyon, "West Racing Against Time for Peace Deal," *London Times*, May 13, 1999.

[122]Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000:160).

[123]S. Myers, "U.S. Military Chief Firm: No Ground Force for Kosovo," *New York Times*, June 3, 1999.

informed NATO command that bombing targets must be limited to military facilities outside urban areas, and only if there was little chance of collateral damage.[124]

American support for the air campaign remained strong throughout the post-summit period. At the same time, the administration was opposed to any action that could have led to a ground war. For instance, they refused to use the Apaches and Task Force Hawk, the weapon that NATO commanders believed would be of most use against Serb forces. In sum, the Americans were staunch supporters of the air campaign but stayed clear of the ground option. The U.S. government continued to demonstrate a moderate overall approach to the NATO campaign in the post-summit phase of the Kosovo conflict.

Assessing the Data

The political statements of each NATO member were consistent with their material contributions to the campaign. The British were strong proponents of military intervention, steadfastly supporting the air campaign while arguing strongly for a ground intervention. The French were more cautious than the British, providing moderate support for the air campaign but questioning the need for ground intervention. German support for the air campaign was very weak initially and had only increased slightly by war's end. The Germans also vocally opposed a ground intervention. Finally, the Italians contributed mostly defensive assets to the air campaign and repeatedly objected to continuing or escalating the operation. They also ruled out ground intervention except as a very last resort. Finally, the Americans were the architects and main contributors to the air campaign but opposed a ground intervention.

Existing theories had only mixed success at explaining behavior during the conflict. Comparing the predictions in Table 3 with actual behavior reveals that a focus on balancing against threats was not a good explanation for the observed behavior. That theory's predictions were only partially correlated with German behavior, and only for part of the conflict. Public opinion fared slightly better, correctly explaining British and Italian behavior and coming close in the U.S. and German instances (although the trend for the Germans was in the wrong direction). Collective action theory and the explanation based on government institutions did significantly better. Collective action theory was consistent with Italian and French behavior and partially consistent with the behavior of the other three states. Predictions based on government institutional structures were consistent with British and Italian behavior and partially consistent with German and American behavior.

In contrast to these mixed results, the integrated decision model introduced here fared much better than did the individual theories. The integrated model's expectation was that institutionally weak executives would provide minimal support for intervention because leaders are concerned more about retaining office than about possibly advancing their state's interests. That prediction is consistent with the evidence for both the Germans and the Italians, both of which have institutionally weak executives. For instance, that the Italian government paid considerable attention to public sentiment should not be surprising given the fragility of their coalition government. The German government essentially chose the same policy, despite German public support for air strikes through most of the conflict, because Green party coalition members opposed the use of force and made that known in no uncertain terms. The Schroeder government complied with many of the Green's demands. To do anything else was to risk the governing coalition. Thus, in both the Italian and German cases, the integrated model's expectations were consistent with the evidence.

[124]Clark (2001:355).

The integrated model predicted that institutionally strong executives would focus more on their state's interests rather than their own office tenure, for the simple reason that it is very difficult to threaten an institutionally strong executive's tenure absent a forthcoming election. The evidence would seem to bear this out for the British and French. Their relatively similar levels of public support for intervention translated into quite different behavior, arguably because their executives had differing conceptions of the international issues at stake. The British have long acted as if they were K-group members willing to ensure the collective good of NATO viability. The Kosovo conflict was no different; the British contributed to the full extent possible. Previous French behavior suggests that they perceive fewer benefits associated with NATO's long-term viability, as we might expect from a state in their geo-strategic position. That is, the French undoubtedly value the NATO alliance but might value it more under European rather than American leadership. Not being a K-group member, the integrated model would predict that the French would provide less support for the intervention. This is what indeed occurred.

The integrated model expected that executives with only moderate institutional strength would incorporate both domestic and international pressures into their decisional calculus. Those expectations held true with regard to U.S. behavior. Clinton administration opposition to ground troops certainly seemed to anticipate a congressional outcry should the administration put boots on the ground and to accurately read the limits of public support for air strikes but nothing further. On issues supported by the public and legislature, such as U.S. intervention via air strikes, international factors seemed to drive executive decision making. On those issues, the U.S. made a significant contribution to the provision of the collective goods at stake.

Overall then, the integrated model seems a potentially useful alternative to the uneven ability of existing foreign policy theories to explain contributions to the Kosovo conflict. But to test whether the model is generalizable to other wars of choice by democracies, I applied the model to the original Gulf War using Bennett et al.'s data on that conflict. Specifically, I categorized the Gulf War states discussed in Bennett according to each state's government institutional structure. I then used Bennet's classification of each state's power, threats faced, and public opinion. Using that data, the integrated model's predictions match each state's actual military contributions to the Gulf War. Conversely, the integrated model provided by Bennet et al. does not do as well as the model presented here at explaining the Kosovo findings. Using Bennet's model, neither the U.S. nor the French should have contributed to Kosovo, the British contribution should have been less robust, and the German contribution should have been larger.

Conclusions

This study has introduced an integrated decision model to explain military interventions of choice by democratic states. My argument here has been that integrated models are useful when exploring complex foreign policy decisions for which there may not be a large number of observations. With few assumptions and a relatively straightforward logic, the model generated some very suggestive results. Most immediately, the integrated model provided a more robust and consistent explanation of state behavior in the Kosovo conflict than did any of the individual theories. That is, the integrated model explained what previous theories explained as well as anomalies that were beyond the scope of existing theories. The integrated model also was generalizable across conflicts, as demonstrated by a brief application to the original Gulf War. This suggests that the integrated model is applicable to instances of formal (Kosovo) and informal (Gulf War) alliance interventions of choice in the modern era.

More generally, the integrated model augments Robert Putnam's two-level game analogy by specifying how governmental institutions generate differing requirements for the domestic ratification of international behavior. In wars of choice, ratification is of a conflictual decision rather than a cooperative international agreement, and ratification takes the form of allowing the executive to stay in office and prosecute the conflict. Some government systems force their executives to anticipate the vagaries of domestic opinion. Other state systems make ratification of conflict decisions a trivial issue. In the latter states, leaders are free to emphasize the international circumstances confronting the state, such as whether the state values a collective good enough to take action. The message here is not just that both domestic and international levels of analysis influence state behavior. Instead, the message is that the integrated model helps determine *how much* emphasis domestic or international factors have on decisions.

My results are not without shortcomings. My findings do not explicitly account for strategic behavior amongst alliance members. Circumstantial evidence suggests that such strategic maneuvering took place with regard to using ground troops in Kosovo, particularly after the U.S. and Germany categorically and repeatedly ruled out that option. Unfortunately, there is very little if any data available to substantiate that intuition. My findings also do not directly address the decision to begin *Operation Allied Force*. As mentioned earlier, the chief constraint here has been a lack of evidence from the smaller European members. Finally, these findings do not account for the negotiations that occurred between NATO and Russia (or NATO and China). One could make the case that Russia influenced NATO behavior, particularly when it came to crafting and then revising NATO demands. This study does not specifically address that influence, however, in large part because of the difficulties involved in measuring how Russian policies might have influenced individual NATO member support for intervention.

Those shortcomings notwithstanding, my results have considerable policy implications for future interventions by democracies, to say nothing of European contributions to the fight against terrorism. Whatever the locale, findings on the links between the domestic and international politics of interventions could help policy makers anticipate and possibly avoid intra-coalition disputes in future conflicts. For instance, U.S. presidents should factor in the domestic constraints and opportunities facing potential allies when contemplating future interventions. Some countries will simply be unable or unwilling to contribute to such interventions due to the actual or perceived domestic political constraints on their leaders. German and Turkish objections to the recent Iraq war come to mind.

U.S. presidents also should be cognizant that diverging conceptions of the value associated with collective goods play an important role in the behavior of states with strong executives. French and Russian objections to invading Iraq are examples of this phenomenon. Indeed, the 2003 Iraq debate points out that NATO may not be well suited for future out-of-area interventions, at least when such interventions require formal NATO approval, especially as the alliance grows larger. Should the U.S. want to use force multilaterally, it should tailor future coalitions-of-the-willing to ensure that military action is domestically feasible from its allies' perspective and defined in ways that activate deeply held convictions regarding particular collective goods.

Appendix









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